Queensland Health’s Surgery Connect programme moves public elective surgery patients into private hospitals at public cost. What it takes for granted – silently, by design – is the specialist capacity on the other side that makes the transfer worth making.
Dual credentialling and genuine dual-site throughput are not the same condition. Australian safety and quality guidance from the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care draws that boundary precisely: credentialling assesses a clinician’s qualifications, experience, professional performance and behaviour, while agreed scope of practice is tied to facility capacity – equipment, staffing, services – meaning a clinician working across multiple sites may hold a different agreed scope at each. Credentialling is necessary for safe practice. It is not designed to guarantee identical working conditions across institutions. Australian health policy relies on a cohort of mixed-practice specialists to carry a share of public specialist demand. The conditions that make that reliance functional – theatre access, equipment continuity, team familiarity – are not mandated by any credentialling framework. Nor are they uniformly present across the workforce. That gap, between formal dual credentialling and operational throughput, is what shapes how specialist access is actually distributed.
A Cohort, Not a Category
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare workforce reporting describes specialist clinical work by setting – public hospitals and private-sector settings – treating multi-setting participation as a normal structural feature of the workforce rather than an administrative anomaly. That framing matters: mixed practice is a time-and-location split with real constraints on when and where hours are deliverable, not simply a matter of holding credentials at two facilities. That boundary-crossing also functions as an active policy instrument across more than one jurisdiction. Between August 2022 and December 2025, NSW Health purchased approximately $446 million worth of procedures from private providers, according to the NSW Audit Office’s 2026 planned surgery review. The Victorian Auditor-General’s planned surgery findings document a parallel initiative to increase public surgery admissions in private hospitals – establishing that Surgery Connect is one instance of a multi-jurisdictional pattern, not a Queensland-specific experiment.
Mixed-practice specialists are not simply doubly credentialled – they form a measurably distinct segment of the Australian medical workforce. Anthony Scott, a professor in the Centre for Health Economics at Monash Business School, Monash University whose research focuses on healthcare labour markets and physician behaviour in Australia, co-authored a 2013 Health Policy study using a nationally representative Australian specialist sample. That study found that mixed-practice and private-practice specialists differ from public-sector specialists in earnings structures, income sources, leave patterns, and number of practice locations; public-sector specialists were more likely to be younger, international medical graduates carrying disproportionate after-hours and on-call work, despite similar total hours worked across practice types. What the policy planning level sees as a unified pool of available specialists is, under the workforce evidence, a contractually stratified cohort with distinct time and location constraints on where hours are actually deliverable. Scott’s research defines this segment by contractual and financial profile, not by operational programme coherence. Within that demonstrably distinct cohort, what sustains genuine high-volume throughput across both settings is not a question labour-market data can resolve. The answer sits in the operational conditions each specialist’s programme actually requires.

The Architecture Behind the Volume
The connection between team conditions and throughput has direct empirical support in the Australian context. A prospective study of operating theatre efficiency at a single centre in metropolitan Melbourne – Wallace et al. (2021) – found that staff motivation and team familiarity were major contributors to efficiently run theatres. That finding locates theatre efficiency in stable teams and repeatable processes, not in the individual credentials any clinician brings to a site.
Genuine dual-site throughput requires a programme structure that holds across two institutional environments – and holding it across two means designing it deliberately for both. Dr Timothy Steel, a neurosurgeon and minimally invasive spine surgeon with a consultant appointment at St Vincent’s Private Hospital and St Vincent’s Public Hospital since 1998, runs an integrated minimally invasive spine programme across both institutions. The programme operates with a dedicated equipment configuration – navigation, optics, endoscopic instruments, and ultrasonic tools – coordinated with a multidisciplinary perioperative team at each site. A career total exceeding 8,000 minimally invasive spine procedures reflects sustained throughput within a practice spanning both settings; the dual-site coordination is demonstrated by the programme’s consistent operational structure across both institutions, not by the aggregate volume alone.
Public and private hospitals operate on fundamentally different capital investment cycles, and that difference sets the terrain any dual-site programme must navigate on the public side. The NSW Government’s $120 million upgrade of Blacktown and Mount Druitt Hospitals – part of a broader $3.8 billion Western Sydney hospital investment – includes two new operating theatres at Blacktown Hospital expected to be completed in 2027. Theatre capacity at a public hospital is competed for and delivered in stages over years. Private hospitals source it on a different timeline entirely.
What Policy Transfers – and What It Leaves in Place
When Australian health policy formally bridges the public-private divide, it coordinates the logistics of patient movement – not the conditions that determine whether the receiving end can absorb what gets sent. Queensland’s Surgery Connect programme is the clearest current instance. Queensland Health covers the cost of surgery provided under the programme and shares information between public hospitals, private hospitals, and treating doctors via a secure Queensland Health web-based system, handling consent workflows, funding transfer, and records coordination. The mechanism is precise about everything it can govern. That precision makes its silence on what the receiving end actually requires all the more pointed.
What Surgery Connect’s design does not reach is the specialist availability, equipment configuration, and team continuity on the private side that determine whether transferred caseload is genuinely absorbable at sustained pace. Those conditions must pre-exist the programme; it is not designed as a capital- or workforce-building instrument that brings receiving-end throughput prerequisites into being. The specialists carrying that caseload belong to the same contractually and financially distinct cohort the workforce evidence identifies, and whether any practitioner within that cohort maintains the operational programme architecture needed to absorb meaningful public volume sits outside what a patient-transfer mechanism can govern. That limitation is structural, not specific to Surgery Connect: the NSW Audit Office frames public-to-private outsourcing as valuable for addressing surges and backlogs while being no substitute for releasing and creating capacity in the system that must ultimately deliver the care. Shannon Fentiman, Queensland’s Minister for Health, Mental Health and Ambulance Services, and Minister for Women, described Surgery Connect in a 2024 answer to a Queensland Parliament question on notice in terms that make the dependency plain.
“Surgery Connect enables public hospital patients to have surgery at a private hospital, by leveraging existing capacity within the private sector.”
– Shannon Fentiman, Queensland Minister for Health, Mental Health and Ambulance Services, and Minister for Women
That phrase signals a pre-existing dependency: the programme assumes throughput conditions are already in place on the private side. What sits on the other side of that boundary, the operational architecture that makes a specialist’s private caseload absorbable at sustained pace, is not something Surgery Connect can create.
From Credentialling to Programme Coherence
Credentialling structures can establish dual-system presence; they cannot mandate the programme coherence that gives that presence operational meaning. Theatre access, equipment continuity, and team stability are shaped by institutional factors that policy influences only partially and addresses unevenly. The assumption embedded in mechanisms like Surgery Connect – that the private side is ready to absorb transferred caseload – is not wrong as a generalisation. But readiness is unevenly distributed across the workforce. It is not a formal property of credentialling itself.
A government programme meticulous about logistics takes its hardest precondition for granted – and that irony holds at the level of system design, not just programme administration. Anthony Scott’s labour-market research establishes that the mixed-practice cohort is contractually and financially distinct from its public-sector counterpart; Dr Timothy Steel’s long-run dual-site programme demonstrates that coordinated equipment, team continuity, and scheduling across two institutions with different governance structures can be sustained over decades. Both point towards the same gap in Australian health workforce planning: credentialling counts are systematically reported, but programme coherence is not measured. When programme coherence goes unmeasured, health workforce planning has no reliable basis for distinguishing credentialled availability from operational throughput capacity.
